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Ab.~/ract-Cumm()n alloll)'mit)' system designs fall inlo
two t:alcgories. Some use a more reliahle archilecture relying un a fixed ami reluli\'e\y small sci of core relays, while
other use a dynamic peer· to-peer (P2P) illfnlslmcluTc 10
dnlw an open-ended pool of rehlys llml provide illlTcascd
scalability. lIuwc\'cr, bolh llpproaches have limitations. The
first design has limited scalnbilit), and allows an mhersllry

to focus on the few entr)' and exit poinls to infer trunic
correlations, ,,'hile the second design can be problematic
in keeping the ol'crall system stable find operating du~ ttl
unpredictable user behaviors and system complexity.
In Ibis paper we propose a hybrid architecture for
anonymit)' s)'slems wilh the consideration of scalflbility
and robuslness, b)' laking the mh'antages from both
static and P2P desi~ns as well a'i balancing the incurred
tradcufTs. W~ describe lill' design in det!dils and discuss its
potential benefits.

anonymity concerns on whether the recipienL of a particular message is identified. Unlinkability. or more precisely. rdmiollsIJip (1/I(1II."III;Iy means thaI Ihe correspondcnn, of a sender and receiver pair is nOl rcvea1c<1.
In this paper. \ve refer to the class of syslems which
provide anonymizing services as (lIwllym;ly sysiems i •
and the associalcd underlying networks as Q/lfJII,\'lJIizing
nelll'Ol'ks.

For some applications like web-browsing :md inslanl
messages. long response time and delays causcd by
the network are commonly considered annoying and
unacceptable. In order to accommodale Lhc low lalency
requirement. anonymity systems face the diffkulLies in
defending againsL some effective allacks like Liming
analysis. Even if the systems swiLch 10 high-lalency
approaches. tney arc still vulnerable to some stronger
atlacks like long-ternl inlersection anacks 11 and disclosure llUm:ks [21-Hl
Many mix-based systems (e.g. [5J. l6J) and Onion
Routing l7J have a fixed and relatively small set of core
relays and Ihe initiator and responder of communicaLions
arc usunlly distinguishable from relays. This makcs an
adversary easily idenLify the Lraffic initiator or responder
at the endpoims provided he conlrols lhc firsl or the last
relay in lhe route. Scalability also becomes a concern in
these slatic designs whcn the users and traffic volume
grow. Dynamic peer-to-peer (P2P) based syslems likc
Tartan fS1 and MorphMix [9j. on the other hand. have
the pOLenLial for drawing an open-ended pool of relays
anti solving the scalabiJilY pfoblem, However. with useroperated nodes as a part of the system, unpredictable
user behaviors can be problematic in keeping Ihe overall
system st:lble and maintaining it easily.
In this paper we propose a hybrid archilecture fOf
anonymily systems with the consideration of scalability
and robustness. by taking the advantages from both

r

I. INTRODUCTION
A v:Hiety of cryptographic mechanisms has bcen dcveloped and deployed to achieve basic security objectives such as confidenLialily. inLcgrily and aULhentication.
While there is an increasing concern on privacy nnd
nnonymity. existing secure prolocols nod systems do nOl
nccessarily provide enough proLeclion in these aspects.
There is a potential market for providing nnonymizing
services and relaled products. For example. anonymous
web-surfing helps users to proLccL lhcir privacy against
censorship of their online behaviors and communications, Anonymizing mech:misms can be used to hide the
existence of tunneled connections and prevent particular
servers from being identified as aLtack targets.
Common requiremelUs of anonymity protection include semler ullonymi/)'. rece;,'er t11lOlIym;D' and Wllil/kalJilifY. An anonymizing service preserves sender
anonymity if. given a set of users and a panicular
message or communicalion. one cannot achieve a higher
probability of identifying the sender (iniLiaLor) of lhat
message "fter the service is applied. Similarly. receiwr

IThcsc SYSICIUS arc also· rererTc(] as anonymous cUlUmunicall011
sySlcms or illlonymily·prol'lding syslCIllS

,
static and P2P designs as well as balancing the incurred
tradeoffs. Such an architecture offers the nexibility to
separate concerns. diSlfibute responsibilities and adopt
different tradeoff strategies among the sub-components
in the architecture. More spccifically our contribution
consists of:
• We provide a brief survey and c1nssification of
mnjor attacks 011 anonymity systems and position
our work in this cOlHeXI.
• We discuss the a<.lvantages and limitations of static
and P2P based anonymity systems 10 1Il0tivnle our
work.
• We presenL a hybrid architecLme that integrates
some of the principles drawn from st:l1ic and P2P
designs. We believe that such an architecture offers
incrensed scalability_ fnulL-tolemnce and sLronger
anonymizing services as each sub-components can
adopt different anonymizing and rouLing strategies.
• We extend the idea of anonymous circuits nnd
introduce the concept of dclegmcs to partitiol1 the
circuits across the sub-systems in our hybri<.l architccLure. More specilicnlly, we break the path into
three sub-paths: submitting path. bridging path and
collecting path. each with its own anonymizing and
routing mcchanisms.
• We discuss the potential benefiLs of the proposed
architecture.
The rest of Lhis paper is organized liS follows. Sec~iol1
II brieny describes some :monymity system designs and
their anonymizing mechanisms. Section III summarizes
several attacks Lo nnonymity systems. Section IV states
the assumptions and goals of our proposed system.
Section V presents the system architecture. Sec Lion VI
describes the protocol details of how messllge content
is handled and how messages are transmitted. Section
VII presents a discussion of our design. Section VIII
concludes our work.
II. RELATED WORK

Many designs of anonymity systems ha"e followed
the concept of using rclay nodes to anonymize traffic.
Anonymizing mechanisms c:m be classified as messagebased and connection-based systems rIO], The former
include mix-based systems which follow the concept
introduced by Chaum [II J. The latter are also referred as
low laLency designs which aim :It providing :monymity
rrotecLion on interaCLive traffic.
Mix-based systems in general utilize one or more
interrnediaLe network nodes Lo rclay messages, and althe
same time, break the correspondence among incoming
and outgoing messages of a relay by chnnging their

appearance and temporal information. This is referred
as the basic batch-and-mi,x operations. in which a mix
collects a batch of fixed-length messages from differenL
sources_ cryptographicnlly transforms lhe batched messages and Ihen forwards a subset of messages (0 Lheir
recipients in a random order. A variety of mix"based
designs have l:Her been developed based on different
topologies. message b:Hching and release policies, and
roule selecLion strategies [12J-II7].
A common mechanism used in low latency designs
is 10 est:lblish an (111011.\'1110115 circllil over several relays
on which messages are forwnrded in multi-hop fashion.
Some systems like Crowds [18J implement the anonymous circuit by extending lhe route of a message to
a random node probabilistically. By doing so. eve!)'
predecessor sending traffic to a node would have certain
probability to be eiLher the initiator or just a forwarder,
and so :IS to obfuscaLe Ihe re:ll initi:Hor. Other systems
like Onion Routing [7J_[19] Lry to hide Ihe route of messages by using fixed-length layer-encrypted sLructures to
cmbc<.l traffic.
With respecL to the topology, some designs like Tarian
181 and MorphMix [91 follow the idea of anonymous
circuits. but explore P2P architecture for the underlying
anonymizing network instead of using a relatively small
and fixed set of core relnys as in Onion ROll Ling systems.
As every peer utilizes the anonymizing services and at
the same time operates as a relay. the overall anonymizing network has a potentially larger and more dynamic
set of relays. The P2P nature of these anonymizing
networks, howe,'er, induces a much higher risk of facing
colluding malicious nodes controlled by adversaries.
Some designs thus provide collusion prevention (e.g.
peer selection protocol in Tarzan) and collusion detection
(e.g. deLection strategy in MorphMix) mechanisms 10
address this issue.
Incentive is anoLher imporlant issue in P2P designs.
The authors in [20] studied the economics in anonymity
systems and pointed out the incentive problem as a major
barrier to wide deploymenl of decentralized :monymity
infrastructures. Several incent i"e mechanisms L21 ]-[251
were proposed Lo encourage beller cooperation and reduce free-riding in P2P systems. ranging from global
economic and reputation Lo loenl exchange- or rewardbused models.
Another type of anonymity systems employs anonymous broadcast or multicas!. Chaum proposed the Dining C!),ptographer protocol [26J which provides strong
anonymity with information-theoretic proofs. Later designs such ns p5 f271 and Herbivore [281 evolve into P2P
architecture with hierarchically organized topology for
the sake of efficiency and sClllability. For the hiernrchical

.1

approaches. the overall system still uses .1 single <Jrchilecture. Unlike Ihe previous systems. our work utilizes a
hybrid architecllIre approach in uesigning an anonymity
syslem with separate security concerns and tmdeoffs
across the underlying sub-syslems.

III. ATTACKS IN ANONYMITY SYSTEMS

For the ease of our discussion and analysis. we give
fI brief summary and c1assilicarion of Ihe adversary's
power and goals as well of Ihe common allacks in
anonymity sysLems. Our classification docs not mefln to
be exhaLislive and we recommend inlerested readers to
refer to the original papers [I]. [21. [41, [101. [29J-[37J
for deLails.

A. AdL'l!rSary·.I· Power

An adversary can be passive or aCfil·C'. A passive adversary only eavesdrops traffic while an aClivc adversary
can observe. modify. inject and drop messagcs in the
anonymily syslem.
The capabiliLy of adversary observing and mrmipulating traffic can be loml or global. The former can only
access lraffic wilhin one or ol1ly very few aulonomous
networks while Ihe IrlLLer is capable to observe effecLively
a large amoulll or all network tinks within the syslem.
The global observability is a mueh stronger flssumplion
on Ihe adversarial power, which also imposes a greaLer
challenge on designing a seeure anonymity system.
This strong assumpLion is reasonable for anonymizing
neLworks wilh a fixed and small set of core nodes.
and parLicularly for Ihose operated by one or a few
pmties. For anonymizing networks with a potentially
larger anu distribuled sel of paniciparing nodes. however,
it is less likely thrlL rln adversary can capture the global
view of traffic. This is usually true in P2P approaches.
which fefllure not only a larger but more dynamic set of
intermediaLe nodes.
An adversary can also be viewed as ;merna! (iI/shier)
or exrema! (ol/fsider). An insider panicipales in the
syslem as a nonnal user or operalor by running his own
nodes but acts dishoneslly or maliciously. An outsider, in
contrast. is generally out of the system scope find wilhout
the privilege of operating Ihe anonymizing services. It
can however access Ihe communication links in the
anonymizing nel\vork. An outsider can act like an insider
by taking control of some nodes in Ihe system ahhough
compromising nodes can oflen be morc difficult and
cosLly La an rldversary.

B.

i\dl'er~'(lry's Goal.~

J) Degrading rhe qualifY of rile allonymi;::.illg .I·en'ices:
A common goal of an adversary Illlllcking :lnonymi!y
sysLems is 10 breflk the anonymizing service or at le:lst
degralle the qualilY of anonymily protection to a certain level. An adversary would lry Lo break the sender
anonymity by linking messages or communications Lo
their originalor. Similarly the receiver anonymity can be
broken if he can figure aLit Ihe corresponding message
recipient. The adversary can further exploil the unlinkability by revealing sender anll receiver correspondence
of messages.
Widely used crypLographic Lechniques. like encryption al1d secure hashing. cannoL completely guarantee
anonymity protection. Communications in an encrypted
secure channel could be vulnemblc to various kinds of
Irnmc analysis and traffic confinnaLion allacks. h is Mill
possible for an adversary 10 identify the sender and
recipient of an encrypLed message even if the encryption
used is sLrong enough to resist any crypLaml[ysis.
2) Decreasin!: Ille lflili;:.miOlI of Ille onon)'mil)' sy.~/em:
User experience and salisfaction can sometimes affect
the utilization of a sysLem. Poor performance, frequent
down-time and annoying experience may outweigh security from the user's perspective. particularly in noncritical applications. For insLancc one may 1101 be willing
Lo wait for hours retrieving a webpage in lcade of
anonymity and privacy protection.
By decreasing the performance, relillbility and availability of an :monymilY syslem. an alLaeker may successfully drive lISers swiLching 10 a lower protection levcl or
completely not using the targcLed system. The potential
threal of this kind of attacks can be severe and Ihus
should not be underestimalcd. The attacker could achieve
similrlr effects in degrading the quality of anonymizing
service but without spending Ihe effort on trarnc analysis.
Denial-of-Service (DoS) aLtfleks are one major Lype of
attacks thrlL render anonymi!y sysLems unresponsive and
unavailable.

C. 7j'pes of Allack
Many attacks in anonymity systems are previously
discussed in f I1 l2], [4 J, [I OJ, [291-[371. Therein traffic analysis poses a great challenge on the design of
anonymity systems. Based on the characteristics of Ihe
allacks, we see some commonalilies among them which
can be classified ns rraffic-specific and ~}'j'lem-specific.
Some allacks Ihat exploit both areas can fit into both
categories.
Traffic-specific allacks are usually based on observation and inference. Mnny anonymity systems achieve

.,
anonymity by obfuscllling lhe correlmion between input
and output messages. In order to break the anonymity.
one has to somehow track the messages within the
anonymizing network or at the endpoints. Mesmge featllre and traffic dynamic.\' <Ire two major sources of hints
thm ease the :malysis. Through passivcly e,n'esdropping
or actively manipulming traHic within the anonymizing
neLwork. an :ldversary tries to observe any distinguishable message features and traffic pallems. By exploiting
correlations between tmffic and nodes in the anonymizing neLwork, the adversary mny be able to infer the rOUie.
!he sender. the receiver and the sender-receiver correspondence of a given message or communication. Endto-end traffic confirmatiun. the disclosure auack [321
and statistical disclosure allncks [21-[4] are examples of
attacks in this category.
System-specific :11l:ICks break anonymity protection
based on the design. limiLmions and flaws of a given
anonymity system. For example. several systems imrlement link padding or traffic shaping policy: an adversary
m:lY use these properties to isolate a particular message
so as La tmce its route. Resource exhaustion like flooding or DoS aUaeks can saturate network links. cause
some nodes unable to opemtc and weaken the whole
anonymity system. Selfishness aunek. which is specific
to P2P designs, also crentes bnd impacts on Lhe sysLem.
J) Allacks Based 011 Mesmge Feaflfre: Message feature chamcterizes Lhc static attributes of the tmffic. It is
one basic scrurce of lacking llser information and thus a
pDint Df aunck. Plain mess<lge contenLS arc obviously vulnembilities thaL cnn expose identification of the sender
and receiver. Variable message sizcs may provide hints
to help adversary distinguish between differenL types of
messages and even tf:lek the message routes. Tagged
messages cnn also highly increase the success rate of
traffic <lnalysis.
2) Arraeks Based on Tmffic Dynalllic.~: Traffic dy~
namics captures the dynamic behavior of messnges over
a communicaLion scssion. which include packcL count
and mess<lge volume, message frequency. timing information. communication patterns and inlersections of
active sender-recipient groups <It different times. Through
enough observations of Lhese behaviors, an adversary
may find correlations between incoming messages and
outgoing messages across nodes in the anDnymizing
network and further deduce message routes and senderreceiver cDrrespondences.
3) End-to-End Traffic COl/jimwtion: Observing the
endpDints in an anonymity system is one simple way
to tmck the sender-receiver correspon<lence. This kind
of analysis can be mounted in most of the anDnymiLy
sysLems :md nD mailer how messages me routed, trans-

formed or mixed within the given systems. Thc intermediate stmctllfe of the anonymity systems can be simply
abstracted as a blnck-box.
By eavesdropping Lhe traffic passing Lhrough tWD
endpoints on a suspecLed route. an advers<lry can study
the correlations between messages entering and leaving
the nnonymous tunnel. The goal of Lhe adversary is to
identify 10 which succeSSDr of the exit node the traffic
from a parLiculnr predecessDr of the cntry node is senL.
If the entry and lhe exit node happen La be thc first and
thc I:lst node respecLivcly in nn anonymous tunnel, Lhe
adversary can sllccessfully figure out the sender-receh'er
pair of a communicatiDn.
If an anonymity system does not handle tmffic ··carefuJly'·. some tmffic pallerns and characteristics may
be exposed which can help !he adversnry !O infer the
correlations. The authors Df L29J, (311 described seveml traffic analysis allacks which can be used for this
purpose. A passive eavesdropper can COUlH the number
of messages thaL enter and exit the tWO endpoints. One
can also measure the inter-message timings and message
frequencies. A timing attack cnn be mounted to correlate
(he timings of n message at the enlry node with thDse
coming out of the ex'l! node. The timing infDrmation may
help the adversary ro figure oul some input message Lo
output message mappings, and rule out some potential
sendcrs or receivers from the anonymity sets. Through
operming or compromising some nodes in the system.
an nctive <ldversary can drop. delay Dr mark messages to
increase thc crfectiveness in exploiting the correlations.

4) Di.w·loslfre Arraek allli Srarisrical Disclosure !\r((leks:
0) The Disclosure Auack: Kesdogan, Agmwal and
Penz [32J described a traffic analysis Lechnique, called
disclosure :l\l:ICk, which is used La infer all pDssible recipients Df a targeted sender in an anonymity system. The
allack is a repetitive inference process which consists of
n learning phase and <In excluding phase. II is based on
the observaliDns of receiver anDnymity sets over the time.
The adversary firsL assumes the number of possible
recipients of a targeted sender s to be m. During Lhe
learning phase, he obtains different recipients seLs Df
s from time to time by observing the incoming and
oUlgoing messages Df .~. The firsl phase finishes when he
collects, as the basis sets, m mutually disjoint recipient
sets such that each Df Ihem contains exactly one recipient
of s.
The attack then proceeds tD the excluding ph<lse in
which Lhe adversary cDlIects additional recipienL sels and
prunes ouL from each basis set those entries that arc not
corresponding recipients of s. For every laLer recipient
set R' he Dbserves, if R' is mutually disjDinl from .,11

but one basis set. he can shrink the non-disjoint basis
sel to ils inlersection wilh H'. He repeats the anfllysis by
refining the v,Jluc of 111 umil he successfully deduces Ihe
possible recipienl sct of s.
b) Srali.~/i{'{lJ Dixclomre Arracks: Obtaining fin opLimal solution in the disclosure anack can be computalionally expensive. D,lIlczis [21 proposed a morc dficiem
approximalion method called slatistical disclosure allack.
In this n!lack. lhe adversnry also observes Ihe recei\'er
anonymity sets corresponding ro the messages scm by a
tmgeted sender s. lie gnthcrs a sequence of observalion
vectors oi where each vector represenls the probnbiliLy
disrribUlion of each recipienL being the recipiem of lhe
message sem by Ij m a particular time. He also oblains
the probability distribtJ!ion II of the background lraffic
Ihat is not relaled to s. By collecling: a large enough SCi
of oi. the adversary can estimate the recipient set of b'
from II :md Ihe arithmetic mean of 6; by the Law of
Largc Numbers. The nUlhors of [31, [4J further eXlCnded
lhe idea to illodel more realistic mix-based systems.
5) Resource ~x'/(/lisrioll and Dell;af-of-Sen'ice A/laeb": Pre-sci system consLraints, limilations on neLwork
link Ilnndwidth. node computational power and availaille
system resources genemlly exist in practical implementations of anonymilY systems. Thcse constraints may allow
an attacker ro launch vmious resource exhaustion attacks.
A nooding-based DoS altnck is one common eXflmple.
By saturming some communication links or overwhelming some processing componems (nodes. routers, etc).
a portion of lhe network may exhibit nOlable changes
in Ihe ongoing traffic and several nodes may behnve
differemly. Deliberalely dropped packets or sclec!ivcly
forwarding messnges can be considered ns another kind
of DoS auacks which can also render identifiable traffic
changes. These attacks would allow an adversary LO
perform further traffic analysis more efficiently. For
instance. an attacker can count any packcL dropping
or perform timing analysis to measure any increased
latency on suspec!cd routes. By parolyzing part of the
ncLwork or flooding the network with idemifinblc traffic,
an adversClry n1<ly also isolnte n targeted message from
others so as to tracc the route of lhat message.
6) Selfishness A/lllck: In P2P anonymizing networks.
a participant is expected to serve olher peers while it
receives services from olhers. Unfortunately some nodes
in realily may wanl Lo free-ride the services without
contributing their resources. For instance, some selfish nodes may selectively forwnrd messages or ignore
incoming requests from ils neighbors. Their behaviors
appear sirnilnrly as the second type of DoS auacks
mcntioned before, bUL due to their selfishness mther than
mnlicious intentions. But evcn they do not inlenlionally

attack the syslem. Ihey still create a had impllct on the
system that would aHow other mlversaries to defcm the
syslcm.
IV. ASSUMPTtONS AND SYSTEM GOALS

A. AsslI/llpriom'

Our anonymily syslem, acronym DAISy 2 (hybriD
architecture for Anonymity SYsLcms). is overlaio on
lOp of lhe IP infrastructure. Users can join the system
nnd use the anouymizing network for communication.
We assumc the underlying IP network is insecure such
that an anacker may observe. injecL or spoof IP packeLs
without being detectcli. Our nnonymity system does
not protecl againsl IP spoofing, but lhis issue can be
addressed by security protocols like IPSEC l38].
As a part of our protocols. we assume n public-key infrasLruCture (PKI) is supportcli. This infrastructure can be
a CenificnLe Authority (CA)-bascd. where a dislributcd
clusler of peer CAs shming a common certificale and
revocmion list can be deployed to improve the CA's
availnbilily.
B. SySTem

Goal.~

Regarding to the anonymizing services, we nim to provide protections wilh lhree different areas of concerns,
in term of mcssage. anonymity and pri\'acy respectively.
• Message prmecLion covers confidentinliLy which
only allows disclosure of message content 10 designated recipients. and imegrity which rcsis!s message
modification during transmission.
• AnonymilY prolection is Ihe core service which provides anonymizing mechanisms for IP-level pointlO-poinL communications. The ultimate gonl is to
preserve, to a certain degree. senlier anonymity.
receiver anonymity find unlinkability with respect
to !raffic and communicmion under differenL circumstances. By "certain" wc mcan the anonymily
protcction should withstand some proposed traffic
analysis attacks, however. it cannot gunrantee a
prefect anonymily solution. More specifically. we
Iry Lo prevent allacks based 011 message feature,
frustrale allncks based on lraffic dynamics by either providing preventive measures or making the
nLlacks much harder in praclice.
• Privacy protection refers La fil!ering privncysensitive contents in messages. As we mentioned
~The n~l1lc ·'DAISY·· h~s ~ lhrcc-fold llIl"aning: (I) our ~rehil~l"lurc
shown in Figure J resembles ~ d~isy nuw~r: (2) Whill" daisy i~ 01
sYlllbol of innoel"llce which coincides Wilh Ihe nalUTl" of :monymily
systems which pro\'idl" cerlilin degree or innocence 10 users: (3)
anonymOllS circuil is similar III a dais)' chain.

,
in section Ill, a m~ssage itself may lack out inforrmuion of the communicating parties and thus
the sender should handle messages properly before
lnmsmining Ihem via lhe :monymizing network.
However. privacy filtering is protocol :md application dependent. We can cenainly pay special
allen lion to COllllllon prOiocols like H·ITP. FrP and
DNS. Yel il is very challenging (0 come up wiLh
a generic and exhaustive fillering enginc as there
arc always evolving prolOcols and newly developcd
applications. In our design. priv:lcy filtering is nOi
our main focus and we only provide basic filtering
funclions such as address rewriling. Nevcrtheless,
users can use specific privacy filtering lOols like
Privoxy [391 on top of DAISY to enhance privacy
protection.
In th~ system perspective, we wanl to achieve cenain
degree of fault tolemnce on the underlying infrastruclure regarding the silU:llions due to heavy traffic Imld.
unexpecled errors. malicious behaviors :md attacks. peer
instability and nelwork dynamics.
V. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

A. A Higll Level Ollerl,jew

The major goal of DAISY is to supporL bidirectional
anonymous point-ta-poinl communications by which we
can anain the anonymity protecLion mentioned in section
IV.
Multi-hop message forwarding on a pre-eslablished
:monymous circuit is a common mechanism used in
low latency anonymity syslems. An anonymous circuit
consists of sevcral relays with the sender and the receiver
as the endpoints. We refer to such an anonymous circuit
as elld-to-elld circuit. The complete circuit is supposed
nm Lo be known by any parLy, and in particular the
endpoinls which arc the sender and lhe receiver should
be uncertain. Every inLennediate relay should only know
its predecessor and successor and that is enough for
routing messages.
Our design uses the anonymous circuit mechanism as
Lhe found lit ion. However. instelld of using one end-toend circuil connecting the sender and the receiver as
endpoints. we break iL into three sub-paths by introducing a special kind of inlennediates called delegates. A
delegate acts as the exit poinL of a circuit that handles
any incoming and outgoing messages on behalf of the
initialor at the other end of the circuit. which we also
refer it as the masrer of the delegate. To visualize iL
in a simpler way. we can consider there is a circuiL
connecling the sender .~ and iLs dclcg:l1e ds . We refer La it
as the Sllhmillillg path. The other circllit connecting the

receiver I" and its delegate dr' forms the collecting pa/h.
and the routing bctween the Lwo delegates d~ and d r
forms the brid[:ing palh. Oncc lhe nodes have established
anonymous circuits for the submilling and lhe collccting
pmh, the message transportation then becomes multi-hop
forwarding on the Lhrec sub-paths.
The introduction of delegmes and the three suh-paLh
transportation prepares for panitioning the anonymity
system into a hybrid archiLeclUrc.

B. 0,,1' Hybrid AJ'chitecfl/re: Design uud Philosophy
J) Mo/imtion:s: An anonymity syslem operaled by
one or a few organizations is commonly a static system
wilh a fixed number of nodes. Scalability becomes a
problem under lhe susrainab1c growth of users and traffic
volume. However. nodes in the system should be more
reliable and accoumable on their behaviors. in the sense
that, it is unlikely that Lhey intcntionally do nOl follow the
protocols or denying their responsibilities. Adversaries to
lhc system are more likely to be external and they would
moniwr the network links nnd c\'en try to get internal
access of Ihe systcm by compromising some nodes. It
is another story if the systcm is designed to trap users
and censor their communications. and this may be beller
addressed as a legal issue.
In contrast, an anonymity system using a P2P architecture has lhe pOlential for wide deployment which helps
solving Ihe senl:lbility problems. By taking nodes from
public to operate the system, it providcs the benefit of
a largc, dynamic. distributed and open-ended pool of
relays which makes cenain allacks harder in practicc.
Wilh respect !O the nodes in the P2P system, they arc
considered unreliable and pOLentially malicious from a
user's poim of view. One should not rely on a panicular
node for the service but he can always choose other peers
!O pair with. This make lhe system as a whole more
resilient !O some corrupted nodes. Rcgarding the entire
P2P system. it is less likely to be under full control by
a "Big Brolhcr", provided therc are good inccntives to
attract good users.
There is in gcncral a tradeoff among security. performance and cosl. A hybrid architeclurc often offers the
flexibility to scparate concerns. distribUle responsibilities
and adopl different tradeoff stnllcgies among the subcomponcnts in the architecture. With this in mind. we
propose La integrate a morc reliable hUl slntic system
with a more scalablc but dyuamlc system. We introduce
a hybrid archilecture that tries La take advantages from
both static and P2P designs. and at the same time.
balance the incurred tradeoffs.
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rig. I.

IJllI5lration of lhe' sySlem archilectllfe

in this paper asiatic lopology and a simple roulim.!
scheme for the CORE. :lnU the details will be given
later in seclion VI. Nevertheless, the underlying topology
and roUling mech:mism in CORE can vary according to
different requiremenls for the degree of anonymity. In
general. the decision of the underlying design considers
the balance among security, perfonnance and cost. As a
design issue. a better CORE would integrate and abslnlct
a number of subsystems with different anonymizing
power and cost. Each subsystem may be designed and
operated serarmely by different panies bUI all of them
conform to a general framework Ihm facilitates interopenllion and global message TOuting. In other words.
the CORE as a whole provides a unified interface with
PANs thm allow users to specify !he security level and
utilize the anonymizing services. Every low-level detail
aboul the subsystems should be tnmsparem to users.

2) Design: DAISY combines tWO types of network:
peripheral {I/wnyll1i:::.illg nelll'ork (PAN) and core delegare network (CORE). Figure I illuslfates a system with
VI. PROTOCOL DETAILS
the CORE and fOllf PANs.
Later in this paper. unless olherwise specified. we
PAN is a dccemralized unstructurcd peer-to-peer overwill stick to the nOlalions in Table I in describing the
lay network. Users who want to utilize the anonymizing
protocols of DAISY.
services will join the PAN and operate as peers using
their machines. In (he remaining lexl. we simply refer to
TABLE I
the nodes in PAN as peers. Due to the unforeseen nature
NmATlONS rN THE PROTOCOL CONTEXT
of participating peers, PAN is generally composed of unCOllcarcllation of message' m l and III~
!Ill 111112
trusled helCrogeneous systems with significant variations
d, Delegme of .I'
in computalional resources and link bandwidth. There
dj ., The ilh delegme in group G j
can be muliiple PANs in the anonymity syslem since a
1~
Tag for idcmifying dillerelll rypcs of me~~age. i i~
rhe lype idenliliCaliOll Humber
peer does not necessarily know the global peer lis\.
Pr'l(,
Priv<lre kcy nf .r
Recall the three sub-path transportation mentioned bePuN" Public ke)' nf ;r
fore, PAN covers the sub mining path and the collecting
R{m.J,)
Encryption of mes,agc /II wilh key !.: (encrypriun
Illerhod depends nn kcy lype)
path. Anonymous circuits are built within PAN using the
S{m. k)
Digital ~ignalure of message III wilh public key k
participaling peers as rclays. These circuits tcnninate at
JJ(m) Cryptogmphic hashing nf me~~age /1l
corresponding delegates residing in CORE, which we
H(m.k) Cryptographic keyed-hashing of mes~agc m with
will mention shortly.
key k
Symlllerric cncryption key for the link oclwccn .r
CORE consists of a relatively stalie set of nodes
and y
that operate as delegares. Ii corresponds to the bridging
I K"..v lnlegrily key for the lillk bel\\'een .r ;1Ilt! y
path in the three sub-paths. and can be viewed as a
SK, Segmem key <IS>OCialed wilh lhe ith relay 1', w.r.l.
rile gil'en cireuir
message exchange nelwork that bridges the gap belween
Segmenl idenlifier for lhc ilh ~egillent (associaled
fIJ,
submilling palhs and collecting paths. As opposed 10
wilh lhe illl relay 1",) \\'.r,l. lhe givclI circuit
multiple PANs, there is only one CORE in (he anonymity
system.
As all transit messages from PAN will be aggregated
inlo CORE, CORE requires a higher nel\vork capacity A Joining ille Network
and compulalional power lo handle the unanticipated
'lb join the :monymizing nelwork in DAISY, a node
amOUn! of traffic. II is thus expected (0 be operated by has to connecl wilh some peers in a PAN. This process
parties wilh more sophisticated machines and nelworks cons isis of three phrases: peer discovery. neighbor forIhat provide reliable services. These parties can be orga- mation and ,"oucher formation.
nizations which provide free and volunlary services, or
The peer discovery is boolslrapped via a rew inforcompanies lhat charge the services.
mation servers or regi.~lrie.\· from which a node can
For Ihe compleleness in our discussion, we describe know other active peers. These registries. which may
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appear as web pages, allow aCLive nodes to publish their
information including IP addresses and public keys. Thc
registries keep refreshing the peer lists !O expire any
inaCLive peers. Peers are responsible for conLacting the
registries regularly and receiving updaLed informaLion.
When a node wants to join a PAN. it obtains an inilial
lisL of active peers from II registry. and aL the same
time. registers its infonnation with the registry. The node
may also consult several registries Lo reduce the chance
of gelling biased infonmltion from a malicious registry.
Based on the list. a nodc can select some of the :Ictive
peers to form a neighborhood. Once i! connecLs with
several peers. they ean exchange peer information with
each other. In lhe following text, we refer to a pair of
peers with II direct link in PAN as Ileigllhors.
During the pairing of Lwo peers, they also negotiate
two keys associated with their link: one encryption
key and one integriLy key. The encryption key is used
for symmetric encryption (per link basis) to provide
confidentiality to sensitive dma in transit on the link.
The integrity key is used for keyed-hashing to protecL
message integrity and prevent impersonaLion.
In addition to neighbors. a node bas to select another
kind of peers called vouchers. The vouchers are involved
during anonymous circuit establishment and are responsible for signing voucher staLements for lhe associ:lted
peer. The voucher relationship is also registered and
signed by the regisLries. and it is publicly available so
thm one can veri fy the vouchers of a given peer. As a
node only communicates with its vouchers on demand.
they need not to fonn a persistent connecLion with each
other. However. as in neighbor formaLion, the node has
to establish an encrypLion key and an inLegriLy key with
each voucher to enable secure communication between
themselves. More details about voucher will be discussed
in section VI-D.

B. Ent!-/()-end Message Hall(l/illg
Before geuing into the dewils of the message IranspOrlalion mechanism, we describe how message content
is handled in an end-to-end manner.
In cnd-Lo-end message handling, privacy-sensitive
contents are filtered such thm the message itself docs
nm lack out any infonnation about the communicating
parties. In addition, end-to-end message confidentinlity
and integrity are protccted. These treatments prevent
againsl attacks on message feature and message tampering. Ideally, cvery handled message appears as "random
tcxt" and does noL reveal any informaLion about Ihe
sender and receiver.
The end-to-end message handling is a compnnion of
the anonymous transportation mechanism and they arc

lIsed together Lo :lchieve the anonymous communicaLion.
In our design. Ihcsc two processes :Ire separate and
independent of each other. Users can cerLainly send
and receive messages via lhe anonymous transporLation
without doing end-Lo-end message hnndling but this
makes several anacks possible.
Suppose m is the original message that s wants to
send to 1'. The geneml process of the end-to-end message
handling is described ns follows:
I. Address re-writing and (optional) privacy filtering

(F(m) is the combined filLering function)
q' '--'- F(m)
2. End-ro-end encryption
1/" ---::

/'('
:. q . EI'
. \.<.1' )

3. End-to-end integrity check

q is the post-processed message that will be transmitred via the anonymizing nelwork. Its cometH appears :IS
random and is tamper-resisted.

C. Tral/sporrarion via AI/onymous Circlli!
An anonymous circuit (circlli, for shon) is a multihop path established among scveral peers in PAN and
tenninates at a deIegme in CORE. We use a sequence
of nodes as the nmation of 11 circllit, for instance. the
J.·th circuit of peer .r with length I is uenoted by C~ ;-::
;1'.1"1.r2, .... rl_1.d~ where r;'s are the intermediate
relays and d.~ is the corresponding delegate. For lhe sake
of simplicity in expressions. we also refer La x as ro and
d.~ as 1',. ri_1 and 1'; (except 1"/) are neighbors in PAN
and there is a direct link bel\veen them. In the contexl
of cirellit. the link between ",--1 and 1"i is referred as the
Ith segmenr. 1";_1 is the predecessor of I'i and T; is Lhe
successor of 1';-1.
As mentioned before. each pair of neighbors share one
encryption key and one integrity key for the associated
link. With respecL to circuit. there is one more encryption
key per segment basis. which we refcr to it as the
segmelll key. As several circuits may share a link for one
segment. each pair of neighbors could have multiple segmen! keys. A locally unique segmelll identifier (segid)
is used to identify a segment between two peers. It is
all<1ched on messages in transmining through a circui!.
Each relay has a roUling table thal contains mappings
in form of (segid lu",,') -; (sll('cessor,segid.,u('('('~sor)'
Based on the segment identifier of an incoming message.
a relay can l.ktermine the next relay and the nexL segment
identifier to forward the message.
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Given thlll q is the post-processed message after emlto-end message h.mdling. Consider a peer .1' is sending q
through one of its eSlablished anonymous circuits. C~ =
.1:.1"1.1"2 .... : d~. Suppose S1\'; is the segmelll key shared
between :[ and rio 1 D; is the identifier for the ith segment
of the circuit.
Before transmitling the message down to the circuit, :1"
encrypts q repealedly using the segment keys in reverse
order:
Cl = n'(q. SKI)
ej

=

E(('.;+1.S/(,)

1 5i < 1

is the final nested encryption of m. :1" encrypts the
identifier of the first segment with EIi.".r.r\ and allaches it
to 1'1. The whole message is then hashed using ll<....,-,.
.1' finally forwards Lhe consolidmed message to 1"1. In
general. I"i_l forwards
to 1"; where
C1

c;'

c; = E(ID i : 1:/('",_I.r,)

e/ = ('.;

II

I ('.;

H(c;.1l\",-,_\,,-,)

Upon receiving r:;', 1"i first validates the mcssage integrity with the keyed-hash. J( Lhen dcerypts the segment
identifier using the link encryption key shared with 1"'_1'
Based on 11);, I"i can uniquely irJentify the segment and
determine the next rclay r;+1 on the circuit. It gets C;+1
by decrypting e; with appropriate segment key. It then
rewrites and encrypts the next segment identifier. and
forwards the consolidated message to ri~}. The process
continues unLil the message finally reaches the dclcgme

Fi~.

EXlcnding

<l

partial circuit during circuit cSI<lbJishmcm

D. Anonymous Circl/il Esrahli.\·hmel1l and Delegare Associa/ion
I) Serril1g up a cirCllir: In the following paragraph, we
describe the complete circuit establishmenr proLocol in
an inductive fashion. Consider a peer x is establishing a
new circuit to a delegate. Suppose an incomplete circuit
with length 1/.1 has been established and :1: is about 10
extend it one relay further. The process (illU.<itrated in
Figure 2) is performed as follows (the details of protocol
messages arc shown in Table II):

1..1' initiates a circuil ex/elISion reqllesr mI. The request

2.

,

( [ .1:'

The uansponation in reverse direction. i.e. frOIll a
delegme to its master, is performed similarly. Each relay
decrypts the segment identiller of the incoming message
and determines the next relay. It encrypts the message
with approprime segmenL key, rewrites and encrypts
the nexL segment identifier. and forwards the upd:lted
message to the nexL relay. The nested encryption of
the original message will finnlly reach the master. The
masLer call then repeatedly unwrap the nested encryption
using the segmenL keys in order.
The nested encryption ollscures the appearance of
messages which frusLrates those <lUacks based on message feaLure. An adversary cannot directly correlate the
incoming and oULgoing through a reIllY based on message contents. The link-based encrypLion also hides the
circuit (segment identifiers) taken by a message and the
integrity check pr~vents segment idelllifier from altered.
The nested encryption together wilh end-to-end message
handling protecLs against message t,lgging altacks.

2_

3.

4.

5.

6.

is encapsulated and transmitted as a normal message
through the p:lf1ial circuit. As described in Lhe previous subsection. each relay on the partial circuil
unwrnps one layer of the nested encryption, rewrites
the segment identifier, re-encrypts and forwards the
message to the neXI relay. The requesl finally appears
in clear text at 1'"..
1'", initiates the request on behalf of x. 1'", randomly
chooses a neighbor y as the next relay. It forwards the
request Lo y in clear. y either accepts or rejecLs the
request based on its aVllilability to eSLablish further
segmenLs.
Suppose y accepts the request. it generntes a reply
mess<lge 1112 and securely sends '11I2 to its associated
vouchers. The voucher Vy.i Lhen signs the hash of the
reply and reLurns it as a voucher statemelll Sy.i back
to y.
After collecting all the sLatements from its vouchers,
y consolidaLes the reply wiLh statements into one
message /11.:J and sends it to 1'"..
1'". sends m:j back to ;1: through the partial circuit as if
it is a normal messllge.:l: on receiving /11.:J verifies the
r~ply and the statements. The voucher relationships
and public keys can be verified by querying the public
registries. If everything is valid, :1' rnndomly generaLes
a new segment key S1(",+1 and reLurns it as m.l in
an encrypted form using Lhe given public key of y.
1n.1 is sent to 1"", through !he parlinl circuit,
011 receiving m.l, 1"". knows that the initiator agrees
y as the next relay 1'".+ 1 and so it forwards m.l to y.
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TABLE [[
MESSAGES IN 'I Hie CIRCUIT EST,\DLlSJlMr,!'1T PROTOCOl.
Illj

=

T IO

II

'WIlC('1

1Jl~ = nOll"'''] II1lonn'~

s~" ~ If'"".,
m.l

=---

m.1

=

m~ =

II

If'v

II

I'IIK!!

S(H(IJJ~). PI'K"JI.')

II -""'.,., II s"v.' II ... II -""'",J
T12111P~ II T::(lIulln'l II flOllc('211 SIC"-'cI. PuKy)

T ll

II

II

1'1311

1112

IOU',

I

7. y returns. as m;j. a locally unique segment idemifier
ID"'+I LO 1"11' such that 1'", and y con later idemify
that segment uniquely by (y.ID",+d and JD".+I
respectively. Both I"u. and y update their routing Lable
Lo include the new segment. y also marks the segment
as lloL (enninated.
In case of any problem during the process, an error
message is fed back (0 the initiator or to the last rclay
on Lhe partial circuit.
Now we step hack to the initial silUation when x
wants to establish the first segment. In this case, Lhe
procedur~s arc the same as what we have mentioned
except :I: now takes also the role of ru. and all the
message transportation within the partial circuit can be
ignored.
2) A.\'.\·oc;miI18 a de/CRaie: Once the initiator is satisfied with the length of an establishing circuit. iL can
compleLe the circuit by associating the circuit with a
delegate. The initiator sends a cirelliT compleTion req/le.w
to the last relay through the partial circuir. The initiator
is responsible for selecting a delegate randomly and
specify it on the request. To avoid uneven or biased
distribution of associations to some Jclegates, there can
be a celHralized server in CORE for assigning Jelegares
upon requests. for simplicity. we leave it as an optional
extension to our design.
On receiving the request. the last relay establishes <I
segment with the chosen delegate in the same way as
intermediate relays except Ihere is no voucher involved
For the delegate. In addition ro a segment identifier. an
expiration time is returned by the chosen delegare. The
expiration time indic<ltes the lifetime of the circuit and
is Forwarded to the initiator via the circuit.
3) SeC/fri/)' aUl/lysis; The circuit is anonymous in
the sense thnt the circuil Formmion process introduces
uncenainty about the actual initialor. By looking at a
circuit extension request. :l peer generally cannot tell
with certainLy whether Ihe predecessor is the initiator
or just a relay on the circuit (excepL when the circuit
extends back to the initiaLor anJ forms a cycle, the
initiator certainly nmices itsell). Unless there exists a
global eavesdropper monitoring all (fafflc or sufficient
colluding peers in deducing the origin of the tranic. the

initiaror can plausibly deny ils role by nrguing the request
is forwarded from its preJecessor. The nonces are used
in the protocol to assure the freshness of messages f1nJ
prevent replay attacks.
The use of vouchers is Lo prevent the l<lst relay on
the partial circuit from cheating. A malicious relay 1'",
sitting ar the end of lhe panial circuit can simulate the
remaining circuit by just replying self-gener<lted public
keys. In absence of Ihe voucher statemems. the initiator
does not know whether 1'". honestly forwards the request
and extends Lhe circuit to a randomly chosen node y.
By forcing !J submilLing several voucher statements.
the iniLifltor can ensure that 1'". really forwarJs the
request to y and y is aware of it. Unless 1'", colludes with
y or with y's vouchers. 1'". cannOf genernte valid voucher
stnlements for Jj. It is possible that 1'", may collude
with some other vouchers and generate stalements for
11 faked node. Enforcement and validation of voucher
relationship are Ihus necessary and (hey are done through
the public registries. As a basic strategy 10 reduce
collusion. we con enforce a peer and its vouchers to
have IP addresses of different domains and with large
varia Lions in IP prefixes. This str:ltegy is also usccl in
previous designs like Tarzan and MorphMix.
Consider the reply message m~ from :'.• "11' cannot
obtain the segment key SJ(w+l as it is encrypted using
y's public key. However. 1'", can substiLute it with another
key. This creates an inconsistency in the segment key
shared by :I: anJ y. The content of later transmiued
messages are messed up as .lJ will wrongly clecrypt the
nested encryption. Note that 1"11' cannot play the trick
by first decrypting the message wilh S'J{"'+1 and reencrypLing it with the substituted key. So doing the
substitution docs not benefil 1"u. much.
In our current design. we leave the choice of the circuit
lengLh to the initiator. The authors in [40J proposed <In
analytical meLhod to optimize the circuit length. in which
they showed thaL either too short or roo long circllit may
lower Lhe f1nonymity degree in the presence of colluding
nodes on the circuit. Ahhough their model considers Lhe
optimization globally and closed-form solutions <Ire only
allowed in some special cases. 1l similar approach can
be used to derive nn estimation of ··good·· circuit lenglh
baseJ on local information of the initiator (with shared
infonnation from neighbors).
4) Mulliple circliiTs. multiple dele8a1cs: Instead of
llsing a single circuit ancl a single delegate, <I peer
can establish multiple circuits to multiple delegates. On
transmitLing a message. a subset of established circuits
is lIsed. The message is split into multiples pieces. each
uses a separate circuit. The fragmented messages arc
finally assembled at the receiver.

"
This approach may complicate the adversary's analysis on correlating the traffic providcd there are sunicicnt
overlaps of circuits such that some mes$rlges from differem paths an:: aggregated into the same intcrmedime
peer on the circuit. Note also that the number of circuits
must be ,I lot more than lhe number of delegates in
general. some circuits originated from different masters
may rllso join at the same delegate. These overlaps create
uncertainties on the route of messages.
The mullip1c circuits can also distribute bursL traffic
more evenly 10 the whole PAN and thus reduce the occurrence of Jistinguishahle traffic differences in congested
circuits.
E. Circlli, Swirc!lil/f? alld Tel/rrlOIl'/I

A delegate association can be terminated when the
master kaves the network. or when the association
expires. When a peer:r leaves Lhe network. it has to tear
down all the established circuits . .I: sends the nOLification
of circuit teardown to associ:lted delegaLes using the
corresponding circllits.
When an associ:l\ion expires, the master pcer takes
the initiative to notify ilS delegate. When the nOlificaLion
messages propagme along those circuits. every node on
the circuits will updaLe its routing table 10 lear down the
paths.
F MC.I"sage Rowing ill CORE
J) A fJasic .w/mion: When a message is forwardeJ

from the sender to a delegate through the submining
circuit. the sender's dclegate d.• has to rouLe Lhe message
to the recciver's delegaLe d r for further delivery. This
message rouling takes place in CORE.
In the simplest case, d.• can Jirectly forward messllges
10 (fl" As one delegate may serve more than one master
and have several established circuits. a message arriving
01 ell' needs to comain information about on which circuit
it should be forwarded. One way to achieve this is Lo usc
lhe segment identifiers in dr's local table since each segmelll identifier corresponds to a unique circuit. However.
this appro<tch cenainly lacks au( some information aboul
the sender and receiver correspondence. Not only d s and
d,. can iJentify each othcr as the involved delegalcs.
anyonc eavesJropping the link between d.. and d r also
knows the fact. Knowing the Jele.gates of scnder and receivcr does not immediately reveal the actual sendcr and
receiver bccause the submitting <tnd collecting circuils
arc still nOl fully uncovereJ.
2) A/lol1Yl1lollS rowillg 011 (I ring ropofogy: On a ring
lopology. messagcs are circlI/lI/cd hop-lly-hop among the
1101.1cs on the ring. AnonymiLy can be preserved in several

ways. First. noise (cover) lrrlffic padding the links on
lhe ring can be used 10 frusLratc lhe packet counting
auack. If every pair of consecutiw nodes shares a secret
key, messages can be hop-by-hop encrypLed such that
an external observer cannot easily correlate the input
and output messages of :1 node. Rather lhan specifying
rhe receiver's information on a message. Ihe scnder s
can put some secret information on the message such
that only the intended receiver r can understand. When
the message is circulated through 1'. r can realize lhe
message is dcstined for it. r can still forward Lhe message
Lo the next hop wiLhout revealing that iL is the recipient.
The sender anonymity com also be protected as a node
generally cannoL be sure if ils predecessor is lhe sender
or just a forwarder unless several noJes collude.
3) Dill' CORE TOpO/ogy alltl milling scheme: For the
design of CORE, we exLend the anonymous rouling on
the ring topology into a more hierarchical fashion. The
Jelegates in CORE are arranged into P = 2 D groups.
Each group comains the S:lme and fixed number of
delegales. which is defined by the group size G. The
value of G is chosen :lppropriately based on the degrec
of nnonymity requircd. In every group. delegates are
arranged in a simple ring IOpology. Suppose we pick
one delegate on a ring as the firsL node and order the
delegates in clockwise fashion. we then assign each
delegate with a defegmc idell/ijier sllch that the ith
delegate of group j has Lhe identifier dj .i (l ::; i ::; G, 1 .:5
:i <: D).
The lth delegates of all the P groups :Ire connected
Logether in a D-dimensional hypercube Lopology l41J.
The inter-group mcssage forwarding can thus be done
in log2 P = D hops via E-cllbe routing [4Jl. Within a
group, messages are transmilleJ hop-by-hop in one-way
direction on the ring topology. Every pair of delegates
shnres a secret symmcLric key for the link cneryption of
messages nowing from one Lo the other. For additional
protection against malicious insiders in CORE, each
group and each delegate can (optionally) have its own
public key, which is used 10 protect a messagc routed
through several groups or delegates from exposing its
content.
Routing in CORE is done by means of iJJfm-grullp circlllarion and inrer-grollp redirccliOH. To beller visualizc
the rouLing mechanism. we Jescribe the delails through
an example.
Consider a CORE Lopology with group size G = 8 as
illustraled in Figure 3. For simplicity. only thrce groups
are shown and the inler-group (hypercube) connections
mc omilted in the figure.
Before any communicaLion is possible. a sender anJ
the corresponding receiver have to agree on an il1-

"
After the ahovc procedures arc done. s can send
messages Lo ". The message roming IS performed as
follows:
I. In order to send a message (/ to r, s submits II along

Fig. 3.

Routiog a message rrom d. 10 d,.
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the common place where Ihe rcceiver can galher Lhe
messages destined to it from a pnrtieular sender. The
routing vector is a ··coarse·' address label to specify
where a message should be rouLed to. These pieces
of informalion arc either specified by Ihe recei\'er or
ncgotiated by barh the receiver and the sender.
Suppose in our example dl.l is the delegate of sender
sand d;{.5 is the delegale of thc corresponding receiver r.
s and I' have already agreed G2 and 'I' as Ihe inlcnncdiate
group and the routing vector respectively. Before s cnn
send a mcssage to 1', l' has to Lell through an anonymous
circuit ils delegatc d:i .5 to register the mapping t' -----;
scyid in the l'eClO1" lab/e. A delegate listens to Ihe Lrarfic
circulaLing on the ring and waits for Lhose messages with
routing vectors found in its vector table. d3 . 5 also needs
La register the mapping 11 - , C:i on the rollling lable of
a delegatc in the intermediate group to allow inter-group
redirectioll. This process is done as follows (the details
of proLoeol messages are shown in Table Ill):

II.

c:

nJ;

111'11 'I

rerlllediare group and an 1"OIIfillg veClOr in an oUI-ofband way. The illlenllediare group can be described as

I.

with (;2 and r 10 dl.l through a circuit.
2. In general. upon receiving n message from iLS m;lsLer.
the sender"s delegaLe randomly selects a delegaLe
(probably iLself) in its group as an inLermediaie relay.
Through anonymous routing on a ring topology, Ihe
message is cin:ulaled from one delegate to anoLher
within the same group. In our example. dl.l chooses
d J •h ;IS the inLermedilltc relay and circulaLes 1712 to
d u ; anonymously.
3. When d 1 .6 reccives 1112. it redirccLs the message to
Ihe intermcdiate group. It refonnats 1112 into 11/3 by
encrypting I' wilh the public key of G'!.. IL Lhen rouLes
1f/3 on its associated hypercube to the corresponding
delegaLe in G'"2' i.e. d,;u.
4. d:!.,(; decrypLs 1113 ;1I1d reformats it as 111;. II thell
on the ring of 2 . The message passes
circulaLes
Lhrough every successive delegaLe on the ring until
it comes back to d2J;; again. During the circulation,
if any delegate has I' in iLs routing tahle (i.e, d2_ 2 in
our example), it will make a copy of the message for
is finally discarded whcn it
further redirection.
visiLS d"2.6 ag'Jin.
5. From its routing wble, d 2 .2 maps 'I.' 10 G:i . It encrypTs
v wit~ the public key of C;l and gets 111.1. By E-eube
routing. (/2.2 routes nl-J on its assoeiaLed hypercube
LO the corresponding delegate in (;3. Le. d;-J,2.
6. d.1.2 decrypts In-J. reformats it ns 111:1 and then circulates I1/J within G:~ similar to Ihe circulation of III;~
in 2 . Any delegate Lhat has registered 'I: in ils vecLor
lable will maintain a local copy of m'J. In our example, d:l.'. gets
ami forwards il 10 corrcsponding
receiver(s). Each receiver finally verifies (/ to ensure
the message is destined to il.

d3.5 randomly selects a delegate in its group as an
intermediate relay. Through anonymous rouLing on
a ring topology. (h5 circulates nl I to the chosen
delegate, i.e. d;1.2.
d:-1.2 re-formals Tn} into m~ by encrypting t' with the
by E-cube
public key of (;2 and thcn iL rOlltes
routing (Q thc delegate in G 2 and which is also on
Lhe same hypercube, i.e. d2.2. lb.2 decrypls rll; and
marks on its routing table the mapping 11 - , G3 .

m;

Ill;

c:

Ill:]

4) SecuTily analysis: The anonymity proteclion depcnds heavily on the inLm-group circulalion method. As
we menLioned before. the exaCL position of the iniLintor or
responder of a message wilh a group is protected Ihrough
Lhe anonymous rouLing on the ring IOpology.
Regarding exLernal observcrs. the per-hop encryption
and appropriate cover Lraffic is used 10 obscure the rouLes
of messages. Effective link padding and cover traffic
algoriLhms arc still under investigation. At this moment,
we choose the variable inter-arrival times traffic padding
as preferred ill [42J.
Regar<ling to insiders. the degree of anonymiLY Clln
be viewed as a funcLion of Ihe group size G and the
distribuLion and percenLage of colluding delegates. In

IJ

an ideal sitmllion. the anonymilY sels of sender and senders. However. message losses may nO! be avoided.
receiver arc proportionally to the group size. However. The initiator of a circuit can also send regulflf heart-bcnl
the presence of insiders cnn greatly reduce the degree of messages 10 test the circuil connectivity.
anonymity.
The use of an intermedinlc group and routing veClor
VII. DISCUSSION
decouples the receiver and rOUling infonnation. Although
We estimalc the mlversary's power and the lhre:lI
lhis approach does not provide a very slrong guarantee
of our design based on the characteriSLics or
model
on anonymilY. iL is a simple method to frustraLe many
direct correlations. The sender's delegate and receiver"s CORE amI PAN. CORE is ralher static in ils strucdelegaLe cannot know each other and each 01 her's group ture wiLh a compaf:llively fixed and small core set of
withouL colluding with the delegates in the inICnnediale delegates. This also implics the ilHerconllected links.
lhe entry and exit points of CORE are fairly sla!ic
group.
As a noLe. lhere could be collusions on the values and few. In addition, since we expect the CORE to be
of the rOUling vecLor. In the inlermediate group and the operated by some organizaLions. it remains a doubt that
receiver's group. (here may be several delegmes waiting those organizalions may monitor the transit lraffic. These
for the same vector I' and Lhat is lhe reason why the potential thrc:lIs may allow an adversary to capture !rafnc
circulations in Lhese two groups travel through lhe whole of a sul'licienlly large portion or c\'en Lhc enlire CORE.
ring. The collusion helps incre:lsing the uncerLainty of To be conservative. we Lhus assume that the adversary
the aClual receiver's delegate bu!. as a tmdeoff. wnstes possesses global ollservabiliLy in CORE.
In conlrast to CORE, PAN is an open stnlclure such
certain bandwidLh in CORE and requires some effort for
a receiver Lo idenlify wheLher ., message is destined to lhm any user can join the network. The peer-la-peer
nature allows PAN to have n f,lr more dynamic and
iL
5) Hardel/ing fhe CORE: Since CORE is lhe hearl of dis!ributed SlrucLurc. :md a potentially larger seL of peers
message exchange in DAISY. lhe fnilure of CORE Illay provided there is a good incentive 10 anract sufficicnt
result in instability, unavailabilily or complcte shutdown peers. Such property has both bad and good impacts
of the whole system. The higher network bandwidLh and on rhe security. On the downside, some unreliable or
computational power requirement in CORE also poses cven malicious peers can parlicip:lIe in PAN easily. Some
a burden on rnnintaining the stability. Faull tolemnt is peers may reside in insecure domains where their traffic
thus a key issue to address. The delegates in CORE can is being profiled. So iL is possible that an adversnry
be buill from a number of clusters which provides high can observe and control a portion of the PAN. On lhe
aggregated nelwork bandwidth and processing power. other hand. it is unlikely that he can observe the whole
Cryptogmphic operations on delegates can also be ac- PAN due to its large, distributed and dynamic Slructurc.
Unrorlunatcly. if n very high ponion of malicious peers
celerated by using cryptographic hardware.
occupy PAN and collude, we face the similar problem
of a global adversary. As a balance. we do not assume
G. Excepfiol1 Hal1dling
a global adversary in PAN but specially take care of
I) BreakdowlI of aI/OI/)'IIIOI/S circlIil: Apart from the collusion among malicious peers. In addition. we expect
nonnni teardown, a circuit can be broken down in some the incelUive prohlem to be addressed OIherwise.
exceptionnl cases. \Vhen a peer :r on some circuits leaves
In lhc view of security and faulHolernnce. we believe
the network. il breaks those nssociated circuits. :r has 10 :1 hybrid architecture cnn also offer several benefits.
send a breakdown notificaLion to the master and delegate
a) MIIII/a! prolecr;ol1: Different types of adveron bOlh sides of nny affected circuit.
saries and allacks exisl in PAN and CORE respecLively,
When a delegate fails !O handle the delegalion, il and thus (hey nre designed accordingly based on their
initiates the notificntion of circuit breakdown to all threat models. PAN nnd CORE as such can be viewed
associated masters. The notificntion is sent and handled as independent and mostly complete anonymity sysin the same way as in case or circuit Leardown but in tems that exhibit different characlerisLics in structure
reverse direction.
and anonymizing slrategies. They as a whole divide
2) Broken al/Ol/ymolls cirellif: In case some reer the responsibililies and provide a mullial protection to
"dies" or leaves (he network unexpecledly. it may cause each Olher. Ir the anonymilY protection is defeated in
the ungracerul brcakdown of some circuilS. When later either PAN or CORE. the remaining one should still
messages are forwarded along lhose broken paths. the provide enough guarantees to preserve sender anonymity,
peers nem lhe bre.,k poims have to nmify the message receiver anonymity or unlinkabililY.

When Ihe initialor of a circuit in PAN is identifieu.
sender anonymity or receiver anonymity cannot be preserved. In such case. we have to rely on CORE 10 prolect the unlinkability of sender-receiver correspondence.
From the perspective of PAN. CORE opermes as an
opaque black box that obscures Ihe eorrdfltion between
inpul and output messages. Without enough [lower to
access tmffic inside CORE an adversmy is restrieled 10
infer uaffie patterns among different cireuils in PANs.
All eXlemal global adversary in CORE can monitor all
Ihe messages flowing among Ihe delegates and further
Lmffic analyze Ihe communication pallerns. With mlditiona I colluding <.Jelegates. Ihe l\dvcrsary has a higher
chance 10 resolve particular message rOUles. The worst
casc happens when Ihe enlire CORE is designeuly malicious. which would be Irue if the parties operming
the CORE inlen<.J to void the anonymily. In such case.
the route of a message within the CORE c.m bc cm;ily
Lraced. ;md Ihe submil1ing anu collecling circuits are
partially identified (OIl leasl one relay on each circoit is
revealed). However. as the nodes in PANs arc sllpposed
nOL to be controlled by CORE, the submitting and collecting circuils still provide proteclion to cover tbe acLual
sender and receiver. To LoLally break the anonymity. the
malicious parties controlling Lhe CORE have to Lraffic
analyze the links in PANs or collude with the peers.
IJ) System II/ai/llellollce: Another benefil appears
in maintenflnce. Even well developed sysleills require
subsequent updaLes Lo inl~grate additional funclionalities
or fix existing flaws. Mailllenance in distribuLed syslems
is considered more importalH as a vulnerabilily in one
participant may cause damages to the enLire system.
However. il is also more difficult as users Illay nOI have
enough incemive to keep their software up-to-date and il
is possible for the updmes 10 be out-of-sync. h is always
beller to reduce inconvenience and rmnoyance to users.
As found nowadays in many operaLing systems. antivirus and personal firewall utililies. automaLic update
function <ll end-user syslem is thus necessary. But thaL
sli]] does nUl give a promise until we can striclly enforce
the aClions. As a compromise. unless for subsLflnlinl
amendmellls in the whole archilecilire. system upgrades
and securily palches can be applied more easily 10 CORE
in a controllable manner. This is also lrue for upgrading
Ihe hardware and nehvork faciliLies in CORE to meellhe
unforeseen requirements.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper. we introduced a hybrid architecLure
approach 10 address some common issues in slmic and
P2P anonymily systems. Our architecture consisls of
two main components: PAN nel\vork (inspired by P2P

systems) and CORE network (inspired by slatic syslems).
The cssence of PAN is to cope wiLh lhe dynamic nature
of users and turn it inlo the anonymizing power. CORE
can be viewed as Ihe traffic aggregaLion point and Ihus
Lhe volume and rale of Imffic becomes lhe main concern
in CORE. The nature of CORE offers lhe possibility 10
achieve a slronger ;monymily al Lhe expense of higher
computmion and communication cost. The segregation
of concerns in the two archiLectures leaves OLit Ihe
space to implement qualily-of-servicc (QoS) control in
CORE. QoS in anonymity systems has not been well
discussed but we believe iL will be an il11portanl issue
when anonymizing services become highly dcmandeu.
In add ilion. such a separation can Lheoretically lead
to increased anonymity. since each sub-component can
use ilS own tailored anonymous routing mechanism and
achieve beLler performance and crfecliveness.
Several design issues still remain for future work.
They include:
• exploring an efficienl mcchanism to deal wilh collusions based on the hybrid nature of our syslem:
• extending our design to supporl anonymolls group
communications:
• exploring n framework for CORE 10 allow users Lo
adjust Ihe balance bctween Ihe degree of anonymily
and Lhe pcrformance of communication.
Finally, while this paper gives more L;lste on the archiLecturnl uesign issues, we arc undenaking Ihe prototype
implemenHlIion and several simulalions and experimenls
10 gain insights inLo the performance and scalabi[ily of
[he proposed architeClUre.
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